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“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that . . . it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
1
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”

I.

INTRODUCTION
2

In the United States today, an adult with a mental disability is
held to the standard of care of a nondisabled, reasonably prudent
3
4
person. That is, a mentally retarded adult is held to the standard
† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2014; B.A., Religion,
magna cum laude, Carleton College, 2003. The author would like to thank
Professors Raleigh Hannah Levine and Michael K. Steenson for their guidance
and critical feedback, and Frances Kern for her encouragement and careful
attention.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
2. The term “mental disability”
represents a convenient, conceptual shorthand for a group of
impairments that affect emotional, developmental, social, or cognitive
functioning, and that frequently are treated similarly within the
framework of the law. Included within “mental disability” are mental
illness, mental retardation and certain other developmental disabilities,
cognitive impairments, traumatic brain injury, learning disabilities,
certain communication disorders, and alcoholism and other drug
dependencies.
JOHN PARRY, CIVIL MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 55 (2010).
“Mental disability” is a relatively recent term. Legal terminology for this group of
people has changed over time. Well into the twentieth century, “insane” was still
used to refer to persons with mental illness, mental retardation, and other mental
disabilities. E.g., William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally
Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52, 52, 61 (1960) (considering “the mentally ill and
mentally deficient” in turn, yet at times referring to members of both groups as
“insane persons”). Mental disability is analogous to the American Psychiatric
Association’s (APA) usage of “mental disorder.” See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxx–xxxi (4th ed., text
rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11(c) (2010) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in
determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”); e.g., Bashi
v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639–41 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §
41 (West 2007)); Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961); Jolley v.
Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 648–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Creasy v. Rusk, 730
N.E.2d 659, 666–67 (Ind. 2000); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300–01 (Or.
Ct. App. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965); DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (2000).
4. The law has a history, mirroring society at large, of using demeaning
language to describe individuals with mental retardation: “idiot,” “imbecile,” and
“feeble-minded” were once regularly used. James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of
Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1079, 1082 n.16. This note uses
the clinical term “mental retardation,” as defined by the APA, because the APA’s
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of care of a reasonably prudent person of average intelligence, and
5
a mentally ill adult is held to the standard of care of a reasonably
prudent person of sound mind. Adults with other mental
disabilities, no matter how severe, are held to the objective,
6
reasonably prudent person standard as well.
At first blush, this rule may not seem fair. In fact, for over 150
years, legal commentators have decried this long-standing rule as
unjust and violative of the fault principle inherent in modern tort
7
law. Yet, despite the vocal criticism, American courts have shown
8
remarkable uniformity in their adherence to the traditional rule,
9
basing their stance on various policy rationales. As a result, adults
10
with a mental disability are held to the objective standard of care.
classification of mental disorders “is recognized in courts as an accepted standard
for diagnosing mental conditions.” PARRY, supra note 2, at 544. According to the
APA:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the
following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B).
The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 41. This note does not use the term “developmental
disability,” as defined by federal statute, because that term includes not only
mental retardation but also such mental disabilities as autism and epilepsy, which
are not addressed here in an individual capacity. See 42 U.S.C. § 15002(8) (2006).
The author is aware of the stigma that has been associated with the term mental
retardation, in particular the usage of “retarded.” However, the term continues to
be medically accurate and remains relevant in describing the individuals this note
aims to address.
5. People with mental illness have also faced stigma in society and by what
courts have called them; “mad,” “lunatic,” “insane,” and “crazy” have all been
employed. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082 n.16. The term “mental illness” is used by
such advocacy groups as the National Alliance on Mental Illness and will be used
in this note. NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012). For the purposes of this note, mental illness is “a broad
category of conditions that can include behavioral and emotional disorders, as
well as cognitive and organic disorders related to neurological and medical
conditions that affect the brain.” PARRY, supra note 2, at 55–56.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11(c) (2010). The objective standard of care is described by the
Restatement: “A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable
care under all the circumstances.” Id. § 3.
7. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 75–129 and accompanying text.
10. The standard is “objective” because it assesses an actor’s conduct against
the ideal of a “reasonably prudent person,” rather than against the subjective
qualities of the actor herself. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
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This note begins by examining the history of the objective
standard of care and its application to children, physically disabled
11
adults, and mentally disabled adults. Part III takes a closer look at
12
the objective mental disability standard, and Part IV argues that a
13
subjective mental disability standard is appropriate and feasible.
Part V contends that, in the alternative, courts should apply a
14
The note
subjective standard with mentally retarded adults.
concludes that a much-needed policy change may be achieved if
15
courts consider individual types of mental disabilities separately.
II. HISTORY
A. Origins of the Objective Standard of Care
Early tort law, through the writ of trespass, was by and large a
16
system of strict liability. While a breach of the King’s peace would
be punished only if a defendant’s conduct was morally
17
blameworthy, an action in trespass could succeed regardless of the
18
An initial aim of both
moral culpability of the defendant.
19
criminal law and tort law was to discourage violence and revenge.
Over time the purpose of tort law shifted from punishing a
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (2010). This note will employ the
shorthand terms “subjective standard” and “objective standard” to denote,
respectively, a standard of care that does or does not take into account certain
qualities of a given actor—specifically, childhood, physical disability, and mental
disability—in deciding whether the actor is liable for negligence. (At times, this
note uses such variants as “subjective childhood standard” and “objective mental
disability standard” to denote the application of these shorthand terms to a
specific group.) This usage follows the Restatement’s: “With physical disabilities,
then—just as with childhood—tort law tailors the negligence standard to
acknowledge the individual situation of the actor. To this extent, tort law employs
what can be called a subjective rather than a fully objective standard of care.” Id. §
11 cmt. b.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 14, at 26 (“[A]t least according to the dominant
view, trespass was initially a kind of strict liability tort.”); Francis H. Bohlen, Liability
in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 16–17 (1925).
17. E.g., Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.) 284 (“[F]elony must
be done animo felonico . . . .”).
18. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 14, at 26 (stating that “[t]he writ of trespass was
based on direct force,” not moral fault).
19. Id. § 8, at 12.
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20

wrongdoer to providing redress to a private party. The historical
21
distinction between trespass and case eventually precipitated the
introduction of the fault principle into English and American tort
22
law.
In the nineteenth century, tort law began to develop a general
23
basis for liability based on fault. To govern negligence law, courts
established a fault-based standard of care based on the notion of
24
the “reasonable man,” against which tortfeasors would be judged.
According to this standard, an actor was required to exercise the
care that a hypothetical “reasonably prudent man” would exercise
under the circumstances to avoid “unreasonable risks of
25
26
The “reasonable man” was a person of
foreseeable harm.”
27
He was
ordinary intelligence, experience, and judgment.
28
expected to exercise ordinary care, not extraordinary care.
20. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 2, at 4; Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and
Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179, 185 (2003); see, e.g., McIntyre v.
Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887) (“There certainly can be nothing wrong or
unjust in a verdict which merely gives compensation for the actual loss resulting
from an injury inflicted.”).
21. The writ of case covered indirect injuries and “was associated with fault
such as intent or negligence on the part of the defendant.” DOBBS, supra note 3, §
14, at 26.
22. See id. § 14, at 27 (noting that, by 1850, “courts tended to assume that
some kind of fault—negligence or intentional wrong—was required to establish
tort liability in most cases” (citing Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292
(1850))); Kelley, supra note 20, at 182–83. Today, “the great majority of tort cases
turn on some kind of perception that the defendant is at fault in a significant way.”
DOBBS, supra note 3, § 9, at 16.
23. DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 112–113 (tracing this development).
24. Id. § 117, at 277. Professor Dobbs notes that courts have used different
language to express the same idea: “The standard is often described as the
standard of ordinary care, due care, or reasonable care. It may also be referred to
as the reasonable person or prudent person standard.” Id. § 117, at 278 (citation
omitted); e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (P.C.) 492; 3 Bing.
(N.C.) 468, 472 (“[T]here were no means of estimating the defendant’s
negligence, except by taking as a standard, the conduct of a man of ordinary
prudence . . . .”).
25. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 116, at 275 (citing Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915)). See supra note 6 for the current Restatement
formulation of the objective standard of care.
26. This is now more commonly referred to as the gender-neutral “reasonably
prudent person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (2010); DOBBS, supra note 3, § 117, at 277 n.4.
27. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1915) (“A [reasonably
prudent man] does not mean an ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of
the community. He is usually spoken of as an ordinarily reasonable, careful, and
prudent man.”).
28. Id.
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Sometimes, though, the exercise of ordinary care was an
extraordinary requirement. That is, it was sometimes impossible
for a physically or mentally disabled person, or a child, to meet the
reasonable man standard. Still, that actor was held to the standard
29
of conduct of a reasonably prudent, non-disabled adult. At the
end of the nineteenth century, no disability—including the
30
“disability” of childhood —was taken into account in assessing an
actor’s conduct, even though her disability made it impossible for
31
Despite the general
her to conform to the objective standard.
32
shift to a fault-based negligence system, disability—physical
disability, mental disability, and childhood—was still governed by a
strict liability rule because the members of each class were held to a
standard that they often could not meet and were liable for harms
33
that they often could not avoid.
B. Development of Exceptions to the Objective Standard for Children and
Physically Disabled Adults
At early common law under the objective standard of care,
34
35
children and adults with physical disabilities were held liable for
the harm they negligently caused, even when they could not avoid
that harm. By the early twentieth century, scholars began calling
for a subjective standard for children “who had no capacity to avoid
36
the conduct causing the harm.” The Restatement (First) of Torts

29. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082.
30. Because children generally have less capacity to avoid risks than a
reasonably prudent adult does, this note will refer to childhood as a “disability” to
introduce a rough analogy to physical and mental disabilities. In the past, the tort
liability of children and mentally disabled people was analogized because
members of both groups often failed to measure up to the reasonable man
standard. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing “cases which hold an
infant or insane person liable for a violation of another’s” personal or property
integrity).
31. Kelley, supra note 20, at 183–95.
32. See David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1992); see
Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082–83; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
33. E.g., Curran, supra note 2, at 65 (“To impose liability for negligence [on a
mentally disabled person], . . . the court must blindly apply the objective
reasonable man standard. [This] is in effect strict liability . . . .”).
34. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 9–10; Kelley, supra note 20, at 188.
35. See Terry, supra note 27, at 47.
36. Kelley, supra note 20, at 188, 193 (“These authors argued, simply, that it
was unfair to hold someone civilly liable for conduct he could not have avoided
because of his age . . . .”).
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exempted children from the objective standard of care, famously
stating that a child’s “conduct is to be judged by the standard of
behaviour to be expected from a child of like age, intelligence and
38
39
experience.” This exemption continues to this day.
Given their immaturity and lack of experience, children are
40
thought to need special protection. Young children in particular
are often incapable of taking necessary precautions to avoid harm
41
Due to their size, young children
to themselves and others.
generally have less ability to cause harm than adults, which may
42
account in part for the subjective childhood standard. Even older
children are granted the benefit of a subjective standard, perhaps
because most children eventually grow into fully functioning,
43
reasonable adults. In other words, the “disability” of childhood,
37. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (1934) (“Unless the actor is a child
or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid
being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”). While
this section also appears to exempt “insane” persons, a Caveat states, “The
[American Law] Institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons are
required to conform to the standard of behaviour which society demands of sane
persons for the protection of the interests of others.” Id. at Caveat. The ALI’s
neutrality did not last long: “Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other
mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does
not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1934).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
10(a) (2010) (“A child’s conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a
reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence, and experience . . . .”).
40. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 125; Kelley, supra note 20, at 196–203. A modern
version of this sentiment is stated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. b (2010):
Children are less able than adults to maintain an attitude of attentiveness
toward the risks their conduct may occasion and the risks to which they
may be exposed. Similarly, children are less able than adults to
understand risks, to appreciate alternative courses of conduct with
respect to risks, and to make appropriate choices from among those
alternatives.
41. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 126.
42. At the same time, it is well established that children engaged in “adult” or
“inherently dangerous” activities are held to the reasonably prudent person
(adult) standard. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(c) (2010). When engaged in an inherently dangerous
activity, a child has the potential to cause as much harm as an adult, which may
explain tort law’s departure from the usual subjective child standard.
43. However, the older a child gets, the less likely her age will shield her from
being liable for negligence. Id. § 10 cmt. b. A child of seventeen can avoid risks of
harm as well as an adult in many situations, and thus the precautions that a
seventeen-year-old of “like . . . intelligence and experience” would take are often

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6

1382

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

and the special legal treatment children receive, is temporary.
Furthermore, childhood is a universal fact of human experience,
which may explain why the law takes it into account in assessing
44
liability for negligence.
While the subjective standard for children gained traction,
commentators began calling for a subjective standard for physically
45
disabled adults. The original hypothetical “reasonable man” was
46
able-bodied, but it was thought unjust to require a physically
disabled person to take precautions that he was physically
47
incapable of taking.
48
Physical disabilities are often fairly easy to diagnose, which
allows courts to expediently determine their nature and extent.
The fact that many physical disabilities are readily observable makes
49
them more difficult to falsify. In addition, persons with physical
disabilities are often able to advocate for themselves, which may
50
partly explain the law’s allowance of a subjective standard.
Unlike the subjective childhood standard, though, the
subjective physical disability standard is often said to demand both
51
less and more of a physically disabled person. While a physically
identical to the precautions that a reasonably prudent adult would take. Id.
44. Courts have articulated a policy of letting children be children, allowing
them to explore and learn, and not quashing their curiosity via a constant threat
of liability. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 125, at 296. A similar policy seems to justify the
attractive nuisance doctrine. See id. § 236, at 614.
45. Kelley, supra note 20, at 195; Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or
Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1927) (“In physical characteristics, the standard
man appears to be identical with the actor. Unless we are to have a completely
objective standard and eliminate all connotation of fault . . ., we cannot require
that a person . . . shall do that . . . which it is physically impossible for him to do.”).
46. See Kelley, supra note 20, at 192; Terry, supra note 27, at 47 (“Every man,
whether he is a standard man or not, is required to act as a standard man
would.”).
47. See Seavey, supra note 45, at 13; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175–76 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] (“The person who is . . . physically disabled, is
entitled to live in the world and to have allowance made by others for his disability,
and the person cannot be required to do the impossible by conforming to physical
standards which he cannot meet.”).
48. For example, deafness, blindness, or amputation.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 cmt. a (2010) (“The physical disabilities this Section takes into account
generally need to be significant and objectively verifiable.”).
50. Id. § 11(a) (“The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent
only if the conduct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with
the same disability.”).
51. See id. § 11 cmt. b; DOBBS, supra note 3, § 119, at 283.
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disabled adult is not required to do what she is physically incapable
52
of doing, she may be required to take additional precautions if
53
For example, to exercise
the circumstances demand it.
reasonable care, a blind person may be required to use a cane or
some other assistance while crossing a busy street, and a
wheelchair-bound person may be required not to operate her
54
wheelchair on uneven terrain. As such, the standard sometimes
requires physically disabled people to offset the effects of their
disability by anticipating certain risks and taking certain
55
precautions.
56
In the mid-twentieth century, Dean Prosser crystallized the
subjective childhood and physical disability standards through his
57
influential treatise and his role as Reporter for the Restatement
58
(Second) of Torts. Prosser’s argument for a subjective standard
for both groups exerted a strong influence on courts and legal
59
commentators. While the limitations of both groups are taken
60
into account, children have the most subjective standard.

52. E.g., Ellis, supra note 4, at 1098 (“[T]he physically [disabled] are not
required to take what would be for them impossible measures for their own
protection or for the protection of others.”).
53. Id.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11 cmt. b (2010).
55. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1100 (“[T]he form of the subjective standard for
the physically disabled incorporates the individual’s knowledge of his own
handicap.”).
56. Kelley, supra note 20, at 199–201.
57. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 227–31 (1941).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (holding a child to the
conduct reasonably expected of a child of “like age, intelligence, and
experience”); id. § 283C (holding a physically disabled person to the standard of
conduct “of a reasonable man under like disability”).
59. Kelley, supra note 20, at 200–01, 203 (“Prosser influenced the
development of the law . . . by describing the law generally in a way that led lawyers
and judges to assume that was what the law was.”).
60. The conduct of a physically disabled adult is compared to that of a
reasonable adult with the same disability, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) (2010), but the conduct of a child is
compared to that of a reasonable child “of the same age, intelligence, and
experience,” id. § 10(a). The childhood standard is more subjective because it
takes into account several characteristics of the child, while the physical disability
standard only considers the person’s disability. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 119, at
281 (noting that the standard of care for physically disabled actors is “partly
subjective”).
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C. No Exception for Mentally Disabled Adults
While the law exempted children and physically disabled
adults from the objective standard of care, it did not do so for
mentally disabled adults. The objective mental disability standard
61
is traced to dicta in Weaver v. Ward: “[I]f a lunatick hurt a man, he
shall be answerable in trespass: and therefore no man shall be
excused of a trespass . . . except it may be judged utterly without his
62
fault.” Because the law of trespass in early seventeenth-century
63
England was by and large a system of strict liability, the statement
64
in Weaver is consistent with the law of that time.
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, scholars began
65
In 1881, Justice Holmes, emphasizing
critiquing this standard.
66
the deterrence purpose of tort liability, stated: “[I]f insanity of a
pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from
complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would
67
require it to be admitted as an excuse.” Holmes reasoned that an
actor who simply cannot comport his conduct to that of a
reasonable man cannot be deterred from violating the reasonable
61. E.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 13; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082.
62. Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.) 284.
63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
64. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082 (“Within the context of strict liability, the rule
[that mentally disabled adults are held responsible for the torts they commit]
made sense . . . .”).
65. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 455–56
(1847) (“In the case of the compos mentis, . . . the act punished is that of a party
competent to foresee and guard against the consequences of his conduct; and
inevitable accident has always been held an excuse. In the case of the lunatic it
may be urged, both that no good policy requires the interposition of the law, and
that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well be termed inevitable
accidents.”), quoted in Kelley, supra note 20, at 184; see also Bohlen, supra note 16, at
18 n.15 (calling the objective mental disability standard “a curious recurrence to
the early objective attitude of the law which looked to the objective wrongfulness
of the act rather than the subjective culpability of the actor”).
66. Kelley describes Justice Holmes’s emphasis on deterrence: “Since the
object and ultimately sole justification for tort liability is deterrence, liability
should not be imposed on those who are undeterrable, either because they are
incapable of foreseeing danger from their conduct or because the threat of
liability can have no impact on their conduct.” Kelley, supra note 20, at 186.
67. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881). While
Justice Holmes appears to advance an affirmative defense for “pronounced” types of
mental disability rather than a subjective standard of care that takes an actor’s mental
disability into account to determine whether she was negligent in the first place,
his criticism of the objective standard is apparent. See infra notes 150–51 and
accompanying text, which address the difference between a subjective standard
and an affirmative defense for mental disability.
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man standard by the threat of tort liability. Professor Francis H.
Bohlen, writing in 1925, argued that holding mentally disabled
people to the objective standard should yield to “the modern
69
concept that liability must be founded on fault.”
While this line of reasoning has continued among legal
70
commentators, it has held little sway over courts, which have
overwhelmingly treated mentally disabled defendants under the
71
objective standard of care. According to the Restatement (Third)
of Torts, “An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless
72
the actor is a child.”
III. ASSESSING THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR MENTALLY DISABLED
ADULTS
Because a mentally disabled person who negligently injured
someone yet was incapable of avoiding her conduct is not morally
73
at fault, the objective mental disability standard does not accord
74
As a result, “American
with modern fault-based tort liability.
courts in common law jurisdictions identified [this issue] as a

68. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 109.
69. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31–32.
70. E.g., Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082; Harry J.F.
Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
20 (1995).
71. E.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 666–67 (Ind. 2000) (“We hold that a
person with mental disabilities is generally held to the same standard of care as
that of a reasonable person under the same circumstances without regard to the
alleged tortfeasor’s capacity to control or understand the consequences of his or
her actions.”); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996)
(“We remain hesitant to abandon the long-standing rule in favor of a broad rule
adopting the subjective standard for all mentally disabled persons.”). Mentally
disabled plaintiffs, on the other hand, were historically treated under a subjective
negligence standard. E.g., Terry, supra note 27, at 47 (“In the case of contributory
negligence there is an exception to [the reasonably prudent person] rule in the
case of . . . persons of unsound mind.”). See infra notes 152–60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of contributory negligence and the law’s
historical dual treatment of mentally disabled plaintiffs and defendants.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11(c) (2010). In line with the courts and with the previous Restatements, section
11(c) covers both mental retardation and mental illness, among other “mental or
emotional disabilit[ies].” See id.
73. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31 (“[Where liability] is imposed upon
persons capable of fault only if they have been guilty of fault, [mental disability],
which destroys the capacity for fault, should preclude the possibility of liability.”).
74. Curran, supra note 2, at 65; see Owen, supra note 32, at 703–05.
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question of public policy and unanimously chose to retain the
75
[objective standard].” The policy rationales that courts developed
can be organized into five categories: (1) incentive, (2) strict
liability, (3) administrative difficulty, (4) integration, and (5)
counterbalancing. Upon examination, the rationales for the
current rule are inadequate to justify the law’s treatment of adults
76
with mental disabilities.
According to the incentive rationale, if mentally disabled
adults are held liable for their torts, their guardians or heirs will be
economically motivated to ensure that their charges do not cause
77
78
This rationale has been roundly criticized because an
harm.
heir or guardian would be more motivated to ensure his charge
does no harm if he were directly liable for the mentally disabled
79
Furthermore, this rationale incentivizes
person’s actions.
guardians and caretakers to confine their charges rather than risk
75. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1083.
76. See id. at 1090; Korrell, supra note 70, at 45.
77. McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602
P.2d 298, 300–01 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B
cmt. b(4) (1965).
78. Korrell notes that the incentive rationale all but died before it was
resuscitated by law and economics scholars. Korrell, supra note 70, at 28 (citing
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
85 (1987)). The economic incentive theory contends that holding mentally
disabled people to a strict liability standard expends fewer judicial resources and
better incentivizes safe conduct. Id. at 30–32. However, the same could be said for
children or physically disabled people, and “under our fault-based negligence
regime, the fact that it may be more efficient to hold a mentally disabled
defendant to a standard he cannot meet is of no consequence.” Id. at 31–32.
Korrell also rejects Landes and Posner’s comparison of mental disability and
abnormally dangerous activities. Id. at 32–33. See infra note 93 for a comparison
between the objective mental disability standard and other instances of strict
liability in modern tort law.
79. Korrell, supra note 70, at 29; David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations
and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the
Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 38 (1981). Along the same lines,
Professor Bohlen argued:
It would seem that if the security of the public demanded that the family
of insane persons should be required to prevent them from becoming a
menace . . . the proper way to effect this would be by imposing upon
them the duty to restrain the insane person and by making [the family]
responsible for his insane acts . . . . It is neither effective nor just to
impose upon the family the indirect incentive of self-interest at the price
of making the insane person answerable for the faults of those who
should be his guardians.
Bohlen, supra note 16, at 35 n.38. Even Kelley, who opposes a subjective standard
for mental disability, rejects the incentive rationale. Kelley, supra note 20, at 206.
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81

liability, which is contrary to modern public policy.
The strict liability rationale has three main expressions: (1)
“where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be
82
borne by the one who occasioned it”; (2) if a mentally disabled
person has money, it is only fair to require her to compensate
83
someone she injures; and (3) the primary purpose of tort law is
84
compensation. The first expression is simply a statement of strict
85
liability. It accurately describes an objective standard for mental
disability, but it does not explain or support that standard.
Professor Bohlen called this principle “a mere restatement of the
old concept of liability without fault dressed up in a new form so as
86
to appear modern and just.” The second expression is a subset of
the first, addressing mentally disabled persons who are financially
able to compensate others, but it similarly does not explain why
they should be required to do so.
The third expression, that compensation is the primary
purpose of tort law, presents a more substantive argument for the
objective mental disability standard. At the end of the nineteenth
century, Judge Thomas M. Cooley explained that the compensation
goal of tort law, unlike the punishment goal of criminal law,
87
Cooley’s
supports tort liability for mentally disabled people.
80. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1085–86.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)(2006), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)
(Supp. III 2009) (“The Congress finds that . . . the Nation’s proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals . . . .”).
While the Americans With Disabilities Act does not directly address the tort
liability of people with mental disabilities, its principles of equality are relevant to
the present inquiry.
82. Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927); see also Jolley v. Powell, 299 So.
2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v. Kearby, 775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 449–50 (N.Y. 1894); Beals v. See, 10
Pa. 56 (1848).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (1965).
84. Delahanty v. Hinkley, 799 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992); THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 56 (Callaghan & Co. 1907) (1878) (“There is no
distinction as to liability between torts of nonfeasance and of misfeasance, because
the ground of liability is the damage caused by the tort.” (citing Williams v. Hays,
38 N.E. 449, 451–52 (N.Y. 1894))).
85. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1084; see Seidelson, supra note 79, at 37–38.
86. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 17.
87. COOLEY, supra note 84, at 54–56. Judge Cooley contrasted the role of
compensation in criminal law and tort law: “[C]ompensation in the case of public
wrongs is usually a subordinate purpose, while in the case of private wrongs it is
the substantial purpose of the law.” Id. at 10.
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theory is described by Kelley:
In the criminal law, where the object is to punish wrongful
acts done with evil intent, we do not punish . . . [mentally
disabled people] who lack the capacity to form an evil
intent. . . . The purpose of civil liability for a tortious
injury, on the other hand, is not to punish one who acted
88
with evil intent but to compensate a wrong suffered . . . .
This is, in essence, a strict liability approach because the
emphasis is not on whether the defendant was at fault but on
whether the plaintiff suffered harm. A mentally disabled defendant
who was incapable of adhering her conduct to that of a reasonably
prudent person is more accurately characterized as “innocent” than
89
at fault.
In contrast to Judge Cooley, Justice Holmes argued that the
basic purpose of tort law is to deter undesirable behavior, which
cannot be accomplished by holding a mentally disabled person to a
90
standard of conduct she is incapable of meeting. In other words,
some mentally disabled people cannot be deterred from engaging
91
in certain risky conduct because of their disability.
The debate about the “primary” purpose of tort law continues
92
However, compensation and deterrence are dual
to this day.
88. Kelley, supra note 20, at 185.
89. See SEDGWICK, supra note 65, at 456.
90. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
91. Some argue that mentally disabled people who cannot control their
conduct to such an extent that they present a high risk of injuring others in the
community should not be allowed to live in the community. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).
While such a policy may be justified for severely mentally disabled people who
present the highest risk of injuring others, it does not extend to other mentally
disabled people who do not present an unreasonable risk to others in the
community. Society has made a deliberate decision to integrate mentally disabled
people into the community, whenever possible, which is incongruent with a policy
of confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); see infra note 115.
92. E.g., Kelley, supra note 20, at 211–19. Kelley argues that the purpose of
the tort system is “to redress private injustices, defined as objectively wrongful
breaches of the community’s safety conventions.” Id. at 181. For example, if a
plaintiff had no reason to know of a defendant’s mental disability and thus had
“reasonable expectations” that the defendant would follow a safety convention of
the community, but the defendant did not follow it and as a result the plaintiff was
injured, the plaintiff was objectively wronged and should be compensated. See id.
at 208 (citing Seidelson, supra note 79, at 19–20), 213−19. On the other hand, if
the plaintiff did not have reasonable expectations that the defendant would follow
the safety convention because she knew of the defendant’s mental disability, the
plaintiff was not objectively wronged and should not be compensated. See id. at
213−19. However, why should a plaintiff’s “reasonable expectations” outweigh a
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purposes that should both be present before liability is imposed.
Deterrence without compensable injury does not give rise to tort
94
95
liability; absent compelling policy reasons, neither should
compensable injury without deterrence. In either case, the
foundation of modern tort liability is half missing.
The administrative difficulty rationale has three basic
expressions as well: (1) if mentally disabled people are granted a
subjective standard, unscrupulous tortfeasors will feign a mental
96
disability; (2) a subjective mental disability standard would result
in severe and costly evidentiary problems, as seen with the insanity
97
defense in criminal law; and (3) it is too difficult to draw a line
between mental disability and mere “variations of temperament,
intellect, and emotional balance which cannot, as a practical
matter, be taken into account in imposing liability for damage
98
done.” Each argument will be considered in turn.
As to the first administrative difficulty argument––that people
will affect a mental disability to avoid liability––modern psychology
defendant’s actual ability to conform to a community’s safety convention? See
infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of notice in
a subjective mental disability standard.
93. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8, at 12 (“The most commonly mentioned aims of
tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of
undesirable behavior.”). In general, there must be sufficient policy reasons for
allowing the tension to break in favor of compensation. Besides the objective
mental disability rule, other pockets of strict liability in modern tort law involve
vicarious liability, products liability, abnormally dangerous activities, wandering
farm animals, and exotic pets. Id. §§ 333, 342–348, 352. With abnormally
dangerous activities, exotic pets, and products liability, there is a high likelihood
of severe harm despite the actor exercising every reasonable precaution. See id. §§
351, 353. The average mentally disabled person living in the world does not pose
a comparable risk. Moreover, a defendant chooses to engage in each of the above
activities that give rise to strict liability, while a mentally disabled person does not
choose to be mentally disabled. And, with vicarious liability, products liability, and
some abnormally dangerous activities, the defendant engages in the activity for
her own pecuniary benefit, which can hardly be said of a mentally disabled person
living in the world. Korrell, supra note 70, at 44. Korrell notes that, unlike
employers or manufacturers of defective products, mentally disabled people are
not good risk distributors. Id.
94. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 377, at 1047.
95. See supra note 93.
96. See McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887); Williams v. Kearbey,
775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 895J cmt. a (1977)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (1965).
97. See Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (1965)).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1) (1965).
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has advanced to such an extent that diagnostic criteria are readily
available for virtually any mental disability, making it difficult to
99
100
Moreover,
falsify one. Courts regularly rely on these criteria.
unlike an accused, a tort defendant is unlikely to feign a mental
101
disability in order to avoid civil liability.
The next administrative difficulty argument, that a subjective
mental disability standard would wreak havoc in tort law, is a
specter for two reasons. First, mental disability is already assessed
in other civil contexts without disastrous administrative
consequences, including guardianship, commitment, and
102
When evaluating a plaintiff’s
testamentary capacity proceedings.
or defendant’s mental disability, triers can rely on expert opinion
103
What’s
as well as their own experience and common sense.
more, courts already take mental disability into account in the case
104
of children, apparently without undue difficulty. Second, unlike
the insanity defense, a subjective standard would not be all-ornothing but would assess a mentally disabled adult’s conduct
against the standard of a reasonably prudent person with the same
105
mental disability. Under a subjective standard, the same mentally
99. See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2 (providing diagnostic criteria for all
mental disabilities recognized at the time of publication).
100. See supra note 4; see, e.g., Fuller v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 423 F.3d 104, 107
(2d Cir. 2005) (describing the DSM–IV as an “objective authority on the subject of
mental disorders”); In re Mohawk Valley Psychiatric Ctr., 818 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770–71
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (“[B]y law, to determine if [a] patient has a mental disorder,
[this] court must take judicial notice of and apply the DSM-IV.”).
101. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 36 n.38 (“[W]hile a [criminal] defendant may
[feign insanity] . . . to escape imprisonment or death, it seems improbable that he
would so discredit himself to escape the payment of money damages.”); Ellis, supra
note 4, at 1087 (doubting that tort defendants would be “willing to assume the
stigmatizing effects” of mental disability “when money damages are the only
penalty at issue”); Seidelson, supra note 79, at 39.
102. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1089.
103. Id.; see Seidelson, supra note 79, at 38−39.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
10 cmt. c (2010) (“Although [an adult’s] . . . mental or emotional disability is . . .
not generally taken into account, under the more flexible rules applicable to
children[,] any evidence of mental or emotional deficit can be considered.”); Ellis,
supra note 4, at 1103. Thus, a child with a mental disability has the benefit of a
subjective standard until the day she turns eighteen, at which point she is treated
like an adult with no mental disability.
105. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1108 (“[A] subjective standard . . . [would] not
immunize mentally disabled people from responsibility for their torts, but [would
relieve them of liability] . . . when they can show that they did their best to avoid
the accident and that further preventive measures were beyond their ability.”).
See infra Part IV.B.1 for a full description of the author’s proposed subjective
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disabled defendant could be found negligent under one set of facts
but not negligent under another, even when she accidentally
106
caused someone harm in both circumstances.
The advances of modern psychology and medicine dispose of
the third administrative difficulty argument as well: that it is too
difficult to draw a line between mental disability and legally
insignificant variations in temperament, emotions, and intellect.
Courts using a subjective mental disability standard would likely
require a sufficient magnitude of mental disability in order for it to
107
be relevant. Some cases may be close calls. Yet, the fact that the
administration of a subjective mental disability standard would
108
require skill and care does not justify eschewing it altogether.
Similar to the administrative difficulty rationale, it may be
argued that, if an adult’s mental disability is taken into
consideration in determining her standard of care, so too should
109
In
an adult’s accident proneness, clumsiness, or ineptitude.
response, a clumsy or inept person with no mental disability can
probably adjust his conduct to avoid certain situations where his
clumsiness or ineptitude bears a high risk of injuring others, based
on prior experience. In contrast, a mentally disabled person may
not be able to do so because her disability impairs her ability to
adjust her conduct, at least to some degree. Thus, it would seem
that an accident-prone adult without a mental disability is, on
average, better able to anticipate and avoid risks than an adult with
a mental disability, and only the latter should receive the benefit of
a subjective standard of care.
110
The integration rationale has been formulated in two basic
mental disability standard.
106. For example, an adult with mild mental retardation could be found liable
for driving into a pedestrian yet not liable for bumping into and knocking over an
elderly person. A factual inquiry into either set of circumstances would determine
her fault, not an inflexible rule.
107. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1089; infra note 143 and accompanying text.
108. Seidelson, supra note 79, at 40. Our legal system asks juries to use skill
and care in deciding questions of fact in challenging cases all the time. Why
should this area of law be different? Cf. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 918 (Cal.
1968) (“Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish
the frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach
some erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process, offers
no reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of causes an artificial and
indefensible [rule].”).
109. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 121, at 286–87.
110. For reasons soon to be apparent, this could more aptly be called the “antiintegration” rationale. See infra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
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ways: (1) “if mental defectives are to live in the world they should
111
pay for the damage they do;” and (2) “deinstitutionalization [of
mentally disabled people] becomes more socially acceptable if
innocent victims are at least assured of [the] opportunity for
112
Considered in light of
compensation when they suffer injury.”
113
deinstitutionalization, these rationales are unsound. The era of
institutionalizing mentally disabled people mars this nation’s
114
history. As institutions for the mentally disabled were closed and
115
the former residents began integrating into the community, they
116
were “unevenly and grudgingly” received. The two expressions of
the integration rationale reveal a begrudging attitude toward
117
integration.
The first expression is blatantly hostile to the notion of people
with mental disabilities living in the world because it makes them
118
Such hostility goes against society’s
insurers of their neighbors.
119
Thinly
decision to integrate people with mental disabilities.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (1965).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11 cmt. e (2010).
113. Deinstitutionalization refers to the closure of large treatment facilities for
people with mental disabilities, allowing the former residents to live in the
community and receive more humane treatment. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“‘[D]einstitutionalization’ has permitted a substantial number of mentally
disabled persons to receive needed treatment with greater freedom and dignity.”).
114. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1085 (describing “an era when numerous laws
were passed to sterilize the mentally [disabled] and to isolate them for life in
institutions”). Specifically addressing the institutionalization of mentally retarded
individuals, Justice Marshall wrote: “[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to
a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ . . . of segregation and discrimination that can only
be called grotesque.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)).
115. Integration is “a policy entitling the disabled to full participation in the
life of the community and encouraging and enabling them to do so . . . .” Jacobus
tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 841, 843 (1966). While Professor tenBroek championed integration
(“integrationism”) for people with physical disabilities, the concept is applicable to
people with mental disabilities.
116. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1107.
117. Id. at 1085 (“The tone of [the Restatement (Second)’s expression]
betrays, at best, a grudging acceptance of the fact that mentally disabled people
do, in fact, live in the world.”).
118. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31–32 (contrasting mentally disabled
defendants with actual insurers and with those who engage in abnormally
dangerous activities).
119. See, e.g., Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of
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disguised, this rationale is yet another iteration of strict liability:
mentally disabled people should pay regardless of fault.
The second expression is less openly hostile to people with
mental disabilities and even purports to help them, and it is less
obviously a strict liability rationale. It begs the question, though:
Why should deinstitutionalization be borne on the backs of those
120
institutionalized in the first place? The
who were wrongly
integration movement seeks to correct a wrong from the past. How
does holding mentally disabled people living in the community to
an objective standard of care—that is, imposing strict liability—
accord with the policies behind the Americans with Disabilities Act
121
While an injured party
and other mental disability legislation?
may be innocent, a mentally disabled injuring party who could not
meet the standard of a reasonably prudent person through no fault
122
of his own is also innocent.
Finally, the counterbalancing rationale holds that, since
people with mental disabilities are often unable to make up for
their disability, extending a subjective standard would be unjustly
123
124
one-sided. Unlike physically disabled people, mentally disabled
125
For
people often cannot compensate for their deficiencies.
mentally disabled people, their mind—and hence their ability to
126
avoid risky conduct—is directly affected by their disability.
Admittedly, a subjective mental disability standard would be
more one-sided than the subjective physical disability standard.
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-402, § 101(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1677, 1678 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 15001(a)(1) (2006)) (“Congress finds that . . . disability is a natural part of the
human experience that does not diminish the right of individuals with
developmental disabilities to live independently . . . and to fully participate in and
contribute to their communities . . . .”).
120. See supra note 114.
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1)
(2006).
122. See SEDGWICK, supra note 65, at 456.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11 cmt. e (2010).
124. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
125. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1100–01 (“The ability to plan ‘around’ the disability
will be available less frequently for mentally disabled persons. The fact that it is
the individual’s mind that is affected will reduce the occasions when the person
can identify that his disability is likely to create [risks] for himself or others.”);
Korrell, supra note 70, at 47 (“When the faculties impaired are the defendant’s
cognitive ones, his other abilities will not be of much help in avoiding the creation
of risk.”).
126. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of this point vis-à-vis mentally retarded
adults.
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Yet, the childhood standard is similarly one-sided—i.e., children
127
Given the
are not expected to “make up for” their childhood.
128
absence of other compelling reasons for the objective standard,
as well as federal mandates to treat mentally disabled people with
129
the balance tips in favor of not requiring a
parity,
counterbalancing effect as part of a subjective mental disability
standard.
IV. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR
MENTALLY DISABLED ADULTS
Neither reason nor policy supports the objective mental
disability standard, and accordingly courts should adopt a
subjective standard for adults with mental disabilities. This is not a
130
novel conclusion, but it is one worth repeating.
A. Public Policy and Modern Science Support a Subjective Mental
Disability Standard
Public policy favors a subjective mental disability standard.
Adopting a subjective standard may not impact a large number of
131
cases, but it would bring the negligence liability of mentally
disabled adults in line with the full citizenship status that society
132
has carved out for them. Though not articulated as a “rationale,”
another likely reason for the objective standard is the public’s
historical lack of familiarity with, fear of, and hostility toward
mentally disabled people as compared to physically disabled
133
As stigma against people with mental disabilities
people.
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 10(a) (2010).
128. See supra notes 77–122 and accompanying text.
129. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001 (2006).
130. E.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31; Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Ellis, supra
note 4, at 1108; Korrell, supra note 70, at 56.
131. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1109.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1)
(2006); Ellis, supra note 4, at 1109 (“[O]n balance, [adoption of a subjective
standard] may be seen as a modest step toward equitable treatment of the
mentally handicapped . . . .”).
133. Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Korrell, supra note 70, at 46 (“Though the era
of fear and of misunderstanding the nature of mental disability has largely passed,
it has left us with a legacy of laws designed to restrict the lives of the mentally
[disabled] . . . .”). Ellis notes that “mentally disabled people were thought to be a
major threat to society in the early years of [the twentieth century],” which left a
“legacy [of] residual fear and discomfort about the mentally disabled.” Ellis, supra
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decreases and mental disabilities come to be better understood and
134
Prejudice against a
managed, this rationale loses force.
historically persecuted class of citizens does not justify the objective
standard. As integration increases society’s exposure to people
135
with mental disabilities, one barrier to a subjective standard is
136
decreasing: ignorance.
In addition, modern medical and psychological advances have
broken down the stark distinction between physical and mental
137
which undermines tort law’s sharp divide between
disease,
physical and mental disabilities, and further bolsters the argument
138
Modern science has
for a subjective mental disability standard.
shown that there is a physical aspect to—if not a physical origin
139
And as discussed
of—many instances of mental disability.
140
above, modern psychology allows courts to better identify the
presence and severity of a host of mental disabilities, which makes a
subjective mental disability standard more manageable today than
in the past.
note 4, at 1099. “This negative side of society’s current ambivalence toward the
mentally [disabled] may be what the American Law Institute has in mind when it
refers to the public’s ‘greater familiarity’ with physical [disabilities].” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. b (1965)).
134. See Korrell, supra note 70, at 46.
135. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1107.
136. Still, as society has become more familiar with mental disabilities over the
past fifty years, the mental disability rule has not changed. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(c) (2010) (stating
essentially the same rule for mental disability as that stated in section 283B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965).
137. E.g., George L. Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for
Biomedicine, 196 SCIENCE 129, 130–31 (1977) (arguing that the biomedical model
of disease inappropriately emphasizes the biological (somatic) factors of disease
and excludes the psychosocial factors of disease). Dr. Engel examined diabetes as
a representative of “somatic disease” and schizophrenia as a representative of
“mental disease” and concluded that both somatic and psychosocial factors are
critical to each: “[V]irtually each of the symptoms classically associated with
diabetes may also be expressions of or reactions to psychological distress, just as
ketoacidosis and hypoglycemia may induce psychiatric manifestations, including
some considered characteristic of schizophrenia.” Id. at 131–32.
138. Korrell, supra note 70, at 14–19 (“[The objective mental disability
standard] makes distinctions between mental and physical problems which
modern medicine does not.”).
139. E.g., PARRY, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that current research suggests that
“at least some [mental illnesses] have a genetic or biochemical component”);
DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN & MARC CHARMATZ, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 5–6
(John Parry & Deborah Zuckerman eds., 4th ed. 1992) (describing several
biological and organic causes of mental retardation).
140. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
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B. A Subjective Mental Disability Standard Is Feasible
1.

Articulating a Subjective Standard

Not only is a subjective mental disability standard appropriate,
it is feasible. To borrow from the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
the expression of a subjective mental disability standard can
parallel the subjective physical disability standard: The conduct of an
actor with a mental disability is negligent only if the conduct does not
conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same mental
141
While some may object that such a formulation is
disability.
142
contradictory, such an objection obscures the fact that mentally
disabled adults have a range of functioning levels and abilities, and
that many of them have the capacity to avoid some, if not many,
risks. Similar to the subjective physical disability standard, the
mental disabilities taken into account would “generally need to be
143
significant and objectively verifiable.”
Examining a case that applies the subjective physical disability
standard helps illustrate how a subjective mental disability standard
144
would function. In Roberts v. State, Burson, a blind concession
stand operator, bumped into and injured the plaintiff while
walking from his stand to the men’s bathroom in the lobby of a
145
Burson had worked at the stand for
U.S. Post Office building.
over three years and did not use a cane when making short trips
146
The
inside the building, instead relying on his “facial sense.”
court found that Burson was familiar with the building and cited
expert testimony that blind people often rely on techniques other
147
than a cane when walking in a familiar setting. One expert noted
that, in a busy environment, a “cane can be more of a hazard than
148
an asset.” The court concluded:
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 11(a) (2010) (“The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is
negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful
person with the same disability.”).
142. Ellis is sensitive to this concern: “‘[T]he reasonable person with similar
mental [disability]’ is a formulation that is at least initially confusing for courts
and juries . . . .” Ellis, supra note 4, at 1101.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11 cmt. a (2010).
144. 396 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
145. Id. at 566–67.
146. Id. at 567–68.
147. Id. at 568.
148. Id.
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Upon our review of the record, we feel that plaintiff has
failed to show that Burson was negligent. Burson testified
that he was very familiar with his surroundings . . . . He
had special mobility training and his reports introduced
into evidence indicate good mobility skills. He explained
his decision to rely on his facial sense instead of his cane
for these short trips in a manner which convinces us that
149
it was a reasoned decision.
The court assessed Burson’s conduct by examining all the
circumstances, in light of Burson’s physical disability and with the
aid of expert testimony. A subjective mental disability standard
would involve the same type of analysis.
Courts could take an adult’s mental disability into account
either as a subjective standard of care or as an affirmative
150
While both approaches would bring about greater
defense.
parity for adults with mental disabilities, a subjective standard of
care is preferable. A child or physically disabled defendant has the
benefit of a subjective standard, where the plaintiff has the burden
of proof to establish that the defendant’s conduct did not meet the
151
While an affirmative defense for mentally
relevant standard.
disabled defendants is better than the current rule, there is no
credible reason why mentally disabled defendants should have a
greater burden of proof than children and physically disabled
defendants.
2.

Borrowing from Other Contexts

A subjective mental disability standard is further supported by
152
courts’ former experience of taking a plaintiff’s mental disability
149. Id. at 569.
150. After his critique of the objective mental disability standard, Korrell
articulates an affirmative defense for mental disability as a four-part test:
If the defendant, because of his [mental] disability, (1) could not
appreciate the consequences of or the risks posed by his conduct, or (2)
could not comprehend the circumstances under which he acted, or (3)
lacked the capacity to act differently or to refrain [from acting], and (4)
thus could not conform his conduct to the standard required, his failure
to conform to the law will be excused.
Korrell, supra note 70, at 49.
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM §§ 10(a), 11(a) (2010).
152. See, e.g., Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, 190 F. 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1911) (‘“In
determining the existence of [contributory] negligence, we are not to hold the
plaintiff liable for faults which arise from inherent physical or mental defects or
want of capacity to appreciate what is and what is not negligence . . . .”’ (quoting
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153

into account when determining contributory negligence.
In the
past, a majority of jurisdictions held that an adult plaintiff with a
mental disability had the benefit of a subjective contributory
154
For decades, mentally disabled adults
negligence standard.
encountered a dual negligence standard: a defendant faced an
155
objective standard while a plaintiff faced a subjective standard.
The dual standard may stem from the difference in public
156
sentiment toward mentally disabled plaintiffs and defendants.
While the threat of mentally disabled defendants injuring others
157
was long imbedded in the social imagination, mentally disabled
plaintiffs who were unable to adequately defend themselves from
158
being injured were likely seen in a more sympathetic light.
Another explanation for the dual standard is that at least two
rationales—incentive and integration—“lose much of their force”
159
Whatever the
when applied to mentally disabled plaintiffs.
reasons, courts throughout the country successfully administered a
160
which
subjective standard for mentally disabled plaintiffs,
indicates that courts are capable of administering a subjective
Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232, 238 (1900))); Noel v.
McCaig, 258 P.2d 234, 241 (Kan. 1953) (“Since knowledge and appreciation of the
peril are essential elements of contributory negligence, it is obvious that an inquiry
into the age, experience, and mental capacity of the plaintiff is material where
contributory negligence is invoked as a defense.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Korrell cites courts’ experience of taking a plaintiff’s mental disability
into account as support for his mental disability defense. Korrell, supra note 70, at
47–49.
153. The contributory negligence doctrine is “[t]he principle that completely
bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the damage suffered is partly the plaintiff’s own fault.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (9th ed. 2009).
154. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 29–30; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1090–91; Korell,
supra note 70, at 48–55; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).
155. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1090–92; Terry, supra note 27, at 47.
156. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1091–92.
157. Id. at 1085 (“By the late nineteenth century[,] . . . mentally disabled
people were seen as a threat to society, both through their own wicked actions and
through the likelihood that they would ‘swamp’ society with their ‘incompetence’
if allowed to reproduce.” (citing WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE
OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS (1975))). Perception of this threat continued into
the twentieth century. Id.
158. Id. at 1091. Courts were also likely sensitive to the harshness of the all-ornothing contributory negligence system, where a plaintiff lost all his recovery if he
was deemed contributorily negligent. See id.
159. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 47, § 32, at 178 (noting that
both rationales are based on the risk of mentally disabled people injuring others,
not the risk of mentally disabled people being injured by others).
160. See Korrell, supra note 70, at 48.
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standard for mentally disabled defendants as well.
161
With the shift to comparative negligence, neither an adult
plaintiff’s nor an adult defendant’s mental disability is taken into
162
Instead, a
account when determining whether she is negligent.
party’s mental disability is taken into account only when
163
164
Under the
responsibility for an injury is apportioned, if at all.
modern comparative negligence and apportionment system, a
mentally disabled plaintiff’s recovery is reduced if she is deemed
165
comparatively negligent, regardless of whether she was actually
capable of protecting herself.
Jurisdictions do not need to return to a contributory
166
negligence regime to adopt a subjective standard of care for
mentally disabled adults. In addition to courts’ past experience of
taking mental disability into account through the contributory
negligence system, they have that experience in several other
contexts: in civil proceedings such as guardianship, commitment,
167
and testamentary capacity; where children’s mental disabilities
168
and, more recently, in apportionment of
are at issue;
161. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 201, at 503−04. The comparative negligence
doctrine is the “principle that reduces a plaintiff’s recovery proportionally to the
plaintiff’s degree of fault in causing the damage, rather than barring recovery
completely.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (9th ed. 2009).
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3 (2000)
(“Plaintiff’s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a defendant’s
negligence.”). The Restatement explicitly rejects the dual standard: “Special
ameliorative doctrines for defining plaintiff’s negligence are abolished.” Id.
163. Id. § 8 cmt. c (“The relevant factors for assigning percentages of
responsibility include . . . each person’s abilities and disabilities . . . .”).
164. Id. § 8 cmt. c, illus. 7 (“The court has discretion, where appropriate, to
limit inquiry into [an actor’s mental disability] on the ground that it would be too
prejudicial, confusing, or misleading or would cause undue delay.”).
165. If the injury occurred in a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction
and the plaintiff is deemed fifty percent or fifty-one percent negligent, depending
on the jurisdiction, she is denied recovery altogether. Id. § 7 cmt. n. This shows
how an arguably unjust result may occur based on the difference of only a few
percentage points of responsibility. If a person’s mental disability compromises
her capacity to anticipate, perceive, or avoid risks, a more equitable approach
would be to take that characteristic into account at the outset. See supra notes 144–
49 and accompanying text.
166. In general, the all-or-nothing nature of contributory negligence should
probably not be resurrected. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. e (2010) (“[C]omparative negligence
renders much less severe the impact of many findings of contributory negligence:
under comparative negligence, such a finding may merely diminish the
[plaintiff’s] recovery.”); DOBBS, supra note 3, § 199.
167. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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169

responsibility.
This experience demonstrates that courts can
adequately manage a subjective standard for mental disability.
3.

Easy and Hard Cases

Granted, some applications of a subjective mental disability
standard would be more straightforward than others. The easiest
cases involve caretakers who are injured by their mentally disabled
charges, and these cases are already decided under something like
170
When a mentally disabled defendant
a subjective standard.
injures a caretaker, as in a nursing home or other institutional
setting, the defendant may not be held liable for the harm
171
This is because the caretaker is paid to confront the risk
caused.
172
of being injured by the charge.
The easier cases involve a plaintiff who was put on notice of a
defendant’s mental disability or a defendant who was put on notice
173
In these situations, the nonof a plaintiff’s mental disability.
disabled actor’s “reasonable expectations” are not frustrated by the
mentally disabled actor’s inability to avoid or minimize the risk of
169. See supra note 161–65 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. 2000) (holding that a patient
with Alzheimer’s disease who kicked and injured his nursing assistant did not owe
a duty of care to the assistant). In Creasy, the Supreme Court of Indiana first
adopted the objective mental disability standard articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, id. at 661–67, but then held that the Restatement’s policy
rationales did not apply given the relationship of the parties. Id. at 667–68.
171. Id. at 667.
172. Id.
(“Rusk’s inability to comprehend the circumstances of his
relationship with Creasy . . . was the very reason Creasy was employed to support
Rusk. . . . Creasy . . . [was] ‘employed to encounter, and knowingly did encounter,
just the dangers which injured’ Creasy.” (quoting Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273,
276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991))). The fact that a mentally disabled person is
entrusted to an institution’s care may serve as a proxy for determining the severity
of the disability, which otherwise would require the assistance of expert testimony.
Id. at 668–69. According to Kelley, “[A] custodial institution charged with the care
of a mentally [disabled charge] . . . has notice of the” charge’s mental disability.
Kelley, supra note 20, at 234.
173. E.g., Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). In Lynch,
plaintiff was a twenty-four year old mentally retarded man who was taken in at the
age of twelve by defendant farmer’s wife. Id. at 274. Plaintiff, who had a mental
age of about ten, assisted defendant with his farm. Id. at 274–75. Plaintiff severely
injured his right arm in defendant’s corn picker and sued defendant, alleging
negligence. Id. at 274. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 277. Because defendant knew of plaintiff’s
mental disability and defendant had not instructed him to stay away from the corn
picker, the court held that the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was
properly submitted to the jury. Id. at 278.
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174

harm.
For example, someone interacting with a person with
Down’s syndrome, whose facial characteristics are well known and
readily identifiable, may be put on notice of that person’s mental
disability.
The harder cases involve a non-disabled party that did not
have notice of the other party’s mental disability. This may occur
where an individual’s mental disability is not obvious or where she
175
is doing something that may not give notice of her disability.
Some argue that a lack of notice is dispositive against application of
176
However, the same
a subjective mental disability standard.
critique could be leveled at the subjective physical disability and
childhood standards. Some physical disabilities (e.g., partial
hearing or vision loss, or mild cerebral palsy) present a lack of
notice, and, while younger children often spontaneously give
notice of their childhood, the same cannot be said of older
children.
Similar to the physical disability and childhood
standards, notice should not be a requirement of a subjective
mental disability standard.
V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A SUBJECTIVE
STANDARD FOR ADULTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION
Because courts have declined to adopt a subjective standard of
care for all mentally disabled adults, they should consider treating
individual types of mental disabilities under a subjective standard.
The characteristics of mental retardation may make a subjective
standard particularly appropriate for individuals with this mental
disability.

174. Seidelson, supra note 79, at 46.
175. E.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961) (holding
defendant with schizophrenia liable for negligence when she walked out of a
psychiatric hospital unattended, got into an idling car, and drove into plaintiff’s
car). In Johnson, plaintiff had no notice of defendant’s mental disability. See id. It
should be noted that a mentally disabled person who knows that she should not
participate in certain activities, such as driving, but does so anyway would not
receive the benefit of a subjective mental disability standard.
176. See Kelley, supra note 20, at 223–52; Seidelson, supra note 79, at 46. In
addition to challenging a subjective mental disability standard of care, both
Seidelson and Kelley criticize the physical disability and childhood standards,
arguing that an actor should be held to an objective standard of care any time the
other party lacked notice of the actor’s disability, thus frustrating the nondisabled
party’s “reasonable expectations.” Kelley, supra note 20, at 223–52; Seidelson,
supra note 79, at 46.
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A. Mental Retardation and Other Mental Disabilities Have Been
Considered Together with Mental Illness Under the Broad Category,
“Mental Disability”
Courts have made little, if any, attempt to differentiate
177
between various mental disabilities for purposes of tort liability.
178
Historically, the
The Restatement rules make no distinction.
179
same terminology was used regardless of the type of disability. As
negligence law developed, the differences between mental
180
retardation and mental illness seem to have been overlooked, as
the two groups were combined under the umbrella term “insanity”
181
and, later, “mental disability.” Compared to mental illness, there
are few cases addressing the negligence liability of mentally
retarded adults. This is true at least in part because there are far
182
fewer mentally retarded people than mentally ill people, and
thus far fewer injuries produced by mentally retarded adults.
B. Even if All Mentally Disabled Adults Are Not Granted a Subjective
Standard, Mentally Retarded Adults Should Be
Mental retardation is a distinct class with readily identifiable
183
and courts should distinguish it from mental
characteristics,
177. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1081 n.10.
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
11(c) (2010) (addressing “[a]n actor’s mental or emotional disability”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) (addressing an actor’s “insanity or
other mental deficiency”).
179. W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Contributory Negligence of Mentally Incompetent or
Mentally or Emotionally Disturbed Person, 91 A.L.R.2D 392, 392 n.1 (1963) (noting
that the term “insane” referred to “[o]utright insanity as well as the less severe
forms of mental and emotional aberration”). See supra note 2 for further
discussion of this point.
180. Because the vast majority of mental disability negligence cases involve
individuals with mental illness, this section at times discusses mental illness as a
paradigm mental disability.
181. This author has not found any case or article that questions the grouping
of mental disabilities into one class for purposes of tort liability. See Curran, supra
note 2, at 61.
182. According to the APA, the prevalence of mental retardation is
approximately one percent. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 46. In contrast, the
prevalence of schizophrenia (a mental illness) alone is approximately one percent.
Id. at 308.
183. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. Mental retardation does share
some characteristics with other mental disabilities, in particular other
developmental disabilities. PARRY, supra note 2, at 56 (stating that mental
retardation and autism are both developmental disabilities, which are “pervasive,
lifelong disabilities . . . typically identified at birth or during childhood”). Yet

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/6

28

McKnite: When Reasonable Care Is Unreasonable: Rethinking the Negligence L

2012]

WHEN REASONABLE CARE IS UNREASONABLE

1403

disability in general by granting adults with mental retardation a
subjective standard of care. Such an approach is justified by the
nature of mental retardation, the relative administrative ease of a
subjective standard for mentally retarded adults, and a limited
comparison between children and mentally retarded adults.
Unlike adults with mental illness, adults with mental
retardation categorically lack the “attention, knowledge,
184
intelligence, and judgment” of a reasonably prudent person.
The distinguishing features of mental retardation are diminished
185
While the
intelligence and compromised adaptive functioning.
mental functioning of an individual with any significant mental
disability is compromised to some extent, a signature trait of
mental retardation is decreased cognitive and intellectual
functioning—and this trait is primary in a mentally retarded person.
While a mentally ill person’s intellectual functioning—and hence
ability to anticipate, perceive, and respond to risks—may be
diminished by her mental illness, this diminishment is often a
secondary trait of her primary mental illness.
A subjective standard for mentally retarded adults would be
easier to administer than one for mentally disabled adults
generally. Some mental disabilities are harder to diagnose and
186
classify than others, but their myriad nature cannot be denied.
While mental retardation has a range of severities, it is concisely
187
188
The presence and severity
defined and manageably classified.
of mental retardation may be contested in a given individual, yet
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has defined four
189
The APA’s classification system would
degrees of the disability.
allow courts to determine what would constitute reasonable

mental retardation remains distinct. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he mentally retarded as a group are indeed
different from others not sharing their misfortune . . . .”).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965).
185. Mental retardation “is characterized by significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning . . . with onset before age 18 years and concurrent deficits
or impairments in adaptive functioning.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 39.
186. See id. at 49–729 (classifying all mental disabilities besides mental
retardation in 681 pages).
187. See supra note 4.
188. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 41–49 (classifying mental retardation in
nine pages).
189. The four degrees of mental retardation are: mild (IQ level 50–55 to
approximately 70); moderate (IQ level 35–40 to 50–55); severe (IQ level 20–25 to
35–40), and profound (IQ level below 20 or 25). Id. at 42.
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conduct for an adult with a particular degree of mental
190
In addition, mental retardation is often observable,
retardation.
even in individuals in the “mild” range, which would further aid
courts in administering a subjective standard for mentally retarded
adults. While some other mental disabilities are also observable,
many are not.
In addition to administrative considerations, mental
retardation is more analogous to the “disability” of childhood than
are other mental disabilities, which further supports a subjective
191
Adults with mental retardation are commonly
standard of care.
described as having a childhood “mental age” that approximates
192
While a minor cannot help
their level of cognitive functioning.
his immaturity, neither can a mentally retarded adult help his
193
194
This comparison has its limits, but it could give a
mental age.
court or a jury helpful context in assessing a mentally retarded
195
adult’s conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note does not advocate that an adult with mental
retardation or another mental disability who carelessly causes harm
to another should never be held liable for her conduct. Rather, it
argues that her disability should be factored into whether or not
she is held liable for negligence. People carelessly injured by
others often deserve compensation. But that compensation should
190. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the subjective childhood standard.
192. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1105; e.g., Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272, 274–
75 (Mo. App. 1965) (concerning a twenty-four-year-old man with the mental age
of a nine-and-a-half- to ten-and-a-half-year-old); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 459 A.2d 421,
422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (concerning a twenty-six-year-old woman with the
mental age of a four-and-a-half- to eight-year-old).
193. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 29 (“In the case of infants there is, of course,
no room for a liability based upon the infant’s responsibility for his immaturity, for
an infant cannot be held responsible for the date of his birth.”).
194. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1105–06 (noting that the functioning level of a
mentally retarded adult is not based solely on his IQ, but also on his many years of
experience in the world, and that “mental age” alone does not give a full picture
of an individual).
195. Admittedly, children grow up, so their special treatment by negligence
law is temporary. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. On the other hand, a
subjective standard for adults with mental retardation would apply for their entire
lives. It is worth noting that the physical disability standard also applies lifelong.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a)
(2010).
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not come at the expense of the fundamental basis of modern tort
liability: fault.
A likely critique of granting a subjective standard of care to
mentally retarded adults is that doing so would open the floodgates
to granting it to adults with other mental disabilities. This note
addresses mental retardation because this mental disability is the
196
That similar arguments could,
author’s area of expertise.
perhaps, be made for granting a subjective standard to adults with
other mental disabilities does not undermine the argument for
granting one to adults with mental retardation. An argument for
extending a subjective standard to adults with a different type of
mental disability would need to stand on its own merits.
American negligence law has tenaciously adhered to its
197
treatment of mentally disabled adults. A leading rationale for the
objective standard is that a subjective standard would be too
difficult to administer. Ironically, the force of this argument largely
comes from the law’s combining of such diverse mental disabilities
as Alzheimer’s disease and borderline personality disorder, autism
198
Considering individual types of mental
and schizophrenia.
disabilities, as this note considers mental retardation, could offer
courts a means of altering their long-standing and rigid approach
to mental disability.

196. The author took undergraduate coursework in mental retardation and
other developmental disabilities. His knowledge of adults with mental retardation
is largely informed by his professional experience working in group homes and
other settings since 2000.
197. While endorsing the principle of stare decisis, Professor Edgar
Bodenheimer noted: “In the United States, stare decisis has never been considered
an inexorable command, and the duty to follow precedent is held to be qualified
by the right to overrule prior decisions.” EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE:
THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 429 (rev. ed. 1974).
198. E.g., Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996)
(noting that “[m]ental impairments and emotional disorders come in infinite
types and degrees,” and refusing to take mental disability into account “given the
complexities of the various mental illnesses and the increasing rate at which new
illnesses are discovered”).
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